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Abstract: Japan has recovered from a ‘lost decade’ of economic stagnation over the 1990s. Anyway, it 
has been a ‘found decade’ for civil and criminal justice law reform, especially in corporate and 
securities law. Yet, have liberalisation and globalisation in those fields led to major changes in the ‘law 
in action’? Does this represent ‘Americanisation’ of Japan’s corporate governance system, focusing on 
shareholders rather than other key stakeholders such as ‘main banks’, core employees, and partners 
within diffuse corporate groups (keiretsu)? This version of our introductory chapter explains how our 
forthcoming book argues for a more complex ‘gradual transformation’. Such shifts are also found in 
many other post-industrial economies, but Japan appears to give greater emphasis given to certain 
modes of achieving change. The book brings together contributions from academics and practitioners 
from Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States. An early chapter introduces 
methodology for effective cross-country comparisons and for evaluating the burgeoning but divergent 
literature on Japanese corporate governance. The concluding chapter compares continuities and 
changes in Japan’s largest companies now and two decades ago. Other chapters cover ‘lifelong 
employment’, main banks, the untold story of closely-held companies, the limited uptake of the 
Committee-based governance form, and the procedural, substantive and FDI policy dimensions of 
takeovers law and practice. 
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Like other major post-industrial democracies around the turn of the 21st century, 
Japan is undergoing a ‘gradual transformation’ in socio-economic relations (Streeck 
& Thelen eds, 2005). Unlike the ‘great transformation’ that engendered the welfare 
state in the mid-20th century (Polanyi, 1944), the current shift is back towards more 
market-driven governance. Yet, entrenched legal and social norms and institutions 
mitigate the pace and influence the direction of this shift. Consequently, the ways in 
which it occurs and the overall extent of the transformation vary among countries, 
although some identifiable patterns are emerging from this transition world-wide.  
One common but relatively low-key means of effecting a ‘gradual 
transformation’ is ‘layering’. This means adding new institutions to see whether 
innovations will percolate through to other fields (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). In policy 
initiatives and practices in Japan, layering seems particularly popular. One recent 
example is the superimposition of new postgraduate ‘Law School’ (hoka daigakuin) 
programs on top of undergraduate legal education since 2004. This reform is aimed at 
boosting the quality and quantity of law graduates able to qualify as bengoshi lawyers, 
public prosecutors and judges (Miyazawa, 2007). A second example of newly layered 
institutions is the greater use of lay participation in legal arenas. For example, in 2009 
Japan will introduce a quasi-jury system (saibanin seido) for serious criminal trials. 
This may, as promised by the reformers, have much broader ramifications for both 
criminal justice and civic engagement (Anderson & Nolan, 2004; Ambler, 2007). A 
third example is the introduction of more lay participation in civil trials. This trend 
can be seen in complex matters such as construction disputes and the new specialised 
Tokyo High Court for appeals in intellectual property disputes (Nottage, 2005a).  
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 All of these wide-ranging reforms emerged from recommendations in 2001 
by the blue-ribbon Judicial Reform Council (‘JRC’). The JRC sought to transform 
Japan from a system based on ex ante regulation by public authorities, into one 
involving more indirect socio-economic ordering based more on ex post remedies 
pursued primarily by citizens themselves. Yet, implementation of these radical 
proposals has been limited by incrementalist ‘reformist conservatism’ (Nottage, 
2006b). More generally, gradualism characterises policy initiatives adopted by Japan 
dating back centuries, including key junctures such as the nation’s re-opening to the 
West and the Meiji Restoration in 1868. Japan tends to delay reactions, shoring up 
anachronistic institutions and sometimes adding new ones. Either this succeeds in 
meeting the new challenges, or more radical changes become necessary. In the latter 
case, the gradual changes already implemented mean that the new situation evolves as 
a progressive step rather than a radical leap (Gluck, 2007; see also Hunter, 2006).  
Nonetheless, Japan is far from unique in its slow but steady responses to the 
country’s economic woes over the 1990s. Other rich countries also tend to delay 
reforms in such situations, for various reasons (La Croix & Kawaura, 2006, pp. 32-3). 
First, accumulated wealth provides a buffer. (Indeed, unlike Korea, Japan did not 
really perceive itself to face an economic crisis, except perhaps over the year or so 
following the failures of securities firms and a major bank in late 1997: Cargill, 2006, 
p. 135). Second, rich countries recently have already committed to economic reforms 
and, therefore, see less need to initiate more far-reaching changes. Third, by their very 
nature in complex societies, institutions cannot be too pliant. Finally, there are now 
fewer successful models to emulate or adapt, compared to the situation facing Japan 
in the 19th century. Even the US has only regained economic momentum since the 
early 1990s. More broadly, social theorists like North (2005) also expect large-scale 
institutional change to be incremental (due to opposition from existing organisations 
against others that have adapted more readily to the new environment) and path 
dependent (shaped by the knowledge and skills that organisations have invested in). 
Corporate governance is a topical area that provides a useful lens to test and 
apply such broader theories of socio-economic change, especially in Japan. During the 
boom times of the 1980s, the Japanese company was regarded as an attractive 
alternative to counterparts in the West, especially in the US. With its emphasis on 
employee welfare (notably, the guarantee of lifelong employment: Rebick, 2005), 
inter-locked shareholdings (often among members of keiretsu or corporate groups: 
Okabe, 2002) and monitoring by a key debt financier (the ‘main bank’ system: Aoki et 
al., 1994), Japanese corporate governance was regarded as equally — if not better — 
suited to achieving strong business results than the ‘insider’ model emphasising 
shareholder primacy. But when Japan slumped into recession, the Japanese company 
was increasingly no longer regarded as a viable alternative.  
Massive reforms to Japanese corporate and commercial law, culminating in the 
consolidated Company Law (No. 86 of 2005: Takahashi & Shimizu, 2005) and the 
2006 amendments to securities regulations (outlined further below in the Appendix), 1 
promised a more market-responsive and transparent model of corporate governance. In 
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the eyes of some, Japan capitulated to an ‘Americanization’ [sic] of key corporate 
governance institutions (Kelemen & Sibbitt, 2002). This trend was reportedly triggered 
by political fragmentation in the early 1990s, combined with economic liberalisation 
and more emphasis on legal services and the formal legal system. Yet, is this really the 
case? With Japan back to steady economic growth since 2002, and many new legal 
reforms firmly in place, it is timely to re-consider how Japanese corporate governance 
has changed during the era following the collapse of Japan’s ‘bubble economy’ of the 
1980s. Has Japan really reached the ‘end of history’ (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001), 
forsaking its own institutions for a shareholder primacy model centred on more arms’ 
length market-driven relationships? Or has there been evolution rather than revolution, 
perhaps even a salutary reaction to shareholder primacy (Iwai, 2006)?  
Various authors in this book, as in other recent works (Blomstrom & La Croix 
eds, 2006; Vogel, 2006; Aoki et al. eds, 2007), generally conclude that there has indeed 
been a gradual transformation rather than radical upheaval. Shifts are occurring at 
various levels, however, and may reveal somewhat different patterns to those evident in 
other post-industrial democracies moving towards more market-based approaches. 
Nonetheless, proving such changes in corporate governance poses several analytical 
challenges. If only to make effective comparisons across insider- and broader 
stakeholder-based systems, the way companies are governed needs to be analysed not 
just in terms of the relations between shareholders and managers, the traditional 
concern of Anglo-American corporate law and corporate governance scholarship 
(Berle & Means, 1932). Relationships with further stakeholders also need to be 
considered, especially with creditors and core employees. Others include supplier 
firms and customers, the government itself, community groups and NGOs (especially 
in this era of Corporate Social Responsibility or ‘CSR’: Keizai Doyukai, 2004; 
Welford, 2005). In particular, corporate governance scholars and practitioners have 
highlighted in Japan the important de facto roles played by main banks and core 
(lifelong) employees as monitors of managerial performance in many Japanese 
corporations (Nottage & Wolff, 2005). This book follows such an approach to 
corporate governance, thereby opening a window onto contemporary capitalism 
generally, as well as its interaction with politics, law and social norms.  
From a theoretical perspective, this allows our findings to draw on — and feed 
back into — the broader theory of ‘gradual transformation’ currently being elaborated 
by experts in political science and political economy (Streeck & Thelen eds, 2005). 
This approach to corporate governance also raises important practical implications for 
the rising numbers of foreign investors, businesses trading with Japanese corporations, 
and policy-makers interested in tracking or guiding the changes underway in Japan. 
Thus, the book offers fresh and up-to-date perspectives on developments in Japanese 
corporate governance, especially in the early years of the 21st century. 
The authors herein approach a range of inter-connected topics drawing on 
their diverse backgrounds. They comprise practising lawyers as well as academics, 
interested in ‘black-letter law’ as well as wider social and political theory. They are 
familiar with developments not only in Japan and the US, but also Australia, Canada 
and Europe. Consequently, the chapters take seriously another methodological lesson 
for comparative corporate governance scholarship: the consideration — explicit or 
implicit — of multiple jurisdictions for comparison. Comparing just two, such as 
Japan versus the US, tends to lead either to over-emphasising divergences or instead 
their similarities. In addition, the authors generally clarify and justify their choice of 
timeframe, since a longer timeframe may tend to highlight greater transformation. All 
consider both socio-economic context (often suggesting continuities) and black-letter 
law (often suggesting change). The authors also make clear any normative preferences 
for change over continuity, since this often colours others’ assessments of what is 
going on in corporate governance in Japan today. Finally, some authors look closely 
at the processes of law reform, not just the specific outcomes. The idea here is that 
even if the latter turn out to involve minor changes, a new process in policy- or 
law-making could indicate a significant transformation, particularly for future 
developments.  
As well as elaborating such core methodological points, Nottage’s chapter 2* 
offers a critical guide to the burgeoning and increasingly divided literature in English 
regarding contemporary corporate governance in Japan. He questions two variants of 
the view that no significant change is occurring at all. One variant, propounded 
especially by John Haley (2005b), emphasises stasis in core employment practices 
and norms in large Japanese corporations. The other, advanced by Mark Ramseyer, 
argues that no change is occurring only in the sense that post-War Japan has been 
governed anyway by market forces. On his view, except perhaps for ‘lifelong 
employment’, key components of the conventional wisdom about Japanese corporate 
governance constitute myths or fables (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2006). Nottage introduces 
studies that rebut this iconoclastic and idiosyncratic account either directly (see also 
Freedman & Nottage, 2006), or indirectly by revealing gradual changes in those 
conventional components of the system (for example, Aoki et al. eds, 2007). 
Nottage’s engagement with the more specific model of ‘gradual transformation’ 
proposed by Streeck and Thelen (2005) as well as other work by political scientists 
(Gourevitch & Shinn, 2005) also results in a critique of the view, common among the 
financial press, that Japan has already achieved whole-scale change and convergence 
on a so-called ‘American model’. 
Wolff’s chapter 3∗ then looks more closely at labour relations, in particular, 
the system of lifelong employment for core employees. Lifelong employment has long 
been held out as not only the centrepiece of Japanese industrial relations, but also an 
emblem of Japan’s stakeholder model of corporate governance. After the decade-long 
recession in the 1990s and early 2000s, some commentators are now predicting its 
‘death’ (or de-institutionalisation). Others, however, are instating that the institution 
remains – and will remain – largely in place. According to Wolff, this raises the stakes 
in the debate. If lifelong employment is dying, does this signal the end of Japan-style 
stakeholder capitalism and the triumph of Western-style shareholder primacy? Or does 
the Japanese model still endure as a ‘variety’ of capitalism? 
Wolff argues that lifelong employment has been abused as a metaphor of 
Japanese stakeholder capitalism. Lifelong employment is not a typical form of 
employment relations in Japan. Even in the minority of cases where it does exist, it is 
neither a benign form of employee welfare nor an inefficient practice that has brought 
corporate Japan to its knees. Nor is it naturally occurring — either as a cultural form of 
co-operative, communitarian capitalism or as the institutional constituent of an 
alternative economic design to self-equilibrating markets. Instead, it is a politically 
invented tradition, initially created to ensure industrial peace in post-War Japan and 
subsequently preserved to support Japan’s ensuing regime of accumulation. The law 
has sustained this strategic choice by erecting a regulatory framework of ‘flexicurity’ 
— a balance between flexibility of working practices and security of employment 
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 This alternative understanding of lifelong employment, Wolff suggests, allows 
a reinterpretation of recent developments in industrial relations in Japan. Employment 
patterns are clearly undergoing important changes. But the empirical data do not 
support conclusions of a convergence to a market-based, termination-at-will system of 
employment, nor the persistence of Japan-specific institutions and norms of employee 
welfare. Instead, a transformation is indeed taking place, one based on the 
intensification of existing regulatory modes of ‘flexicurity’. This intensification might 
very well lead to a crisis in the labour-management nexus in Japan (as predicted, for 
example, by Blomstrom & La Croix, 2006, p. 11), or perhaps even its wholesale 
overthrow. So far, however, no new political compromise has been struck. 
Wolff’s conclusions open up provocative theoretical challenges. First, since 
‘culturalist’ and neo-institutional theories fail to explain the developments in industrial 
relations in Japan, new theories are needed to understand the dynamic change in 
Japanese legal and economic institutions. Second, since lifelong employment is a 
governance technique that is not universal, ahistorical nor neutral, new theories are 
required that take seriously the heterogeneous, transient and political dimensions of 
corporate governance. Third, since Japanese capitalism is a regime of accumulation 
like any other, yet with its own defined set of strategic choices, new analytical tools are 
called for to interpret the roots of the Japanese political economy (not just its 
institutional manifestations) and for reaching informed assessments about its normative 
value (not just calibrating assessments to Japan’s fluctuating business cycle). 
Puchniak’s chapter 4* then turns to main banks, another major distinctive 
component conventionally associated with post-War corporate governance in Japan. 
He rejects Ramseyer’s free-market theory by summarising empirical and case study 
evidence showing how Japanese banks systematically persisted in lending trillions of 
yen to ‘zombie’ firms at below-market interest rates to save them from bankruptcy 
over the ‘lost decade’ (1990-2002). A matrix of unique institutional incentives (such 
as capital-asset ratios required under the Basel Accord) made it worthwhile for banks, 
especially main banks, to engage in behaviour that Ramseyer would view as 
impossibly irrational. The survival of main banks over that difficult era suggests that 
they will continue to play a considerable role in Japanese corporate governance. 
Hopefully, they now enjoy once again a less perverse institutional environment. Yet, 
banks face a new regulatory environment following the implementation of Japan’s 
‘Big Bang’ reforms in the late 1990s (outlined in this chapter’s Appendix; and in 
more detail by Kozuka, 2005, and Cargill, 2006). Banks are also increasingly 
subjected to scrutiny through the court system.2 Further, the ongoing role for main 
banks as actual or potential monitors of their client firms depends on the evolving 
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environment influencing core employees, shareholders and other key components of 
Japan’s corporate governance system. 
Matsui’s chapter 5* then tells a relatively untold story, even in the vast 
literature in Japanese: corporate governance issues in closely-held firms. In Japan as 
elsewhere, the vast majority of Japanese companies are small in size and owned by a 
few shareholders, often a parent corporation or family members. As such, they 
command an important economic presence in the market and play a unique role in 
Japanese industry. The new Company Law provides a new future for the governance 
of smaller enterprises. Giving voice to an industrial policy aimed at promoting market 
entry for new, innovative venturers, the new Law provides smaller companies with 
the ability to customise their management structures and ex ante share schemes to 
better suit their business needs. Smaller companies also generate unique types of 
shareholder conflicts in the form of minority oppression. Under the mandatory 
provisions of the old Commercial Code, the oppression remedy had limited scope 
(Shishido, 1990). However, under the new Law with its relaxed share-class provisions, 
shareholders in smaller companies are able to be more strategic in their relations with 
one another. Courts may also start to turn to the emerging takeover jurisprudence for 
public companies in developing the oppression doctrine to resolve the conflicts that 
will inexorably emerge as a result.  
Only then does this book turn to the more conventional concerns of 
Anglo-American corporate governance theory and literature: developments directly 
affecting public companies. Lawley’s chapter 6* adds an innovative qualitative study 
to uncover patterns in the limited uptake of the option offered to Japan’s large 
corporations since 2004 of replacing a more German-inspired board system with a 
more Anglo-American ‘Committee-based’ system (Puchniak, 2003; Gilson & 
Milhaupt, 2005). Such ‘elective’ corporate law reform, and its so far limited direct 
impact, provides another excellent example of the ‘layering’ method of achieving a 
gradual transformation, particularly in Japan. 
A trilogy of chapters then focuses on overlapping aspects related to Japan’s 
rise of hostile takeovers in recent years, prefigured in Matsui’s chapter. The numbers 
remain very small, and no major Japanese company has actually been taken over 
(Puchniak, 2008). However, hostile takeovers remain a major area of debate and 
concern in the corporate and legal worlds, both within Japan and abroad.3 Dooley’s 
chapter 7# identifies this controversial field as one where the Japanese courts had 
provided less guidance. Fewer cases have reached them, although there are some 
continuities with judgments resulting from a small run of takeovers disputes in the 
late 1980s (Kozuka, 2006). Hostile takeovers also represent one, of now very few 
areas, which the legislature has still not been addressed comprehensively. Instead, 
‘soft law’ reform has played a prominent role. A major impetus came from Guidelines 
released in May 2005 by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (‘METI’) 
together with the Ministry of Justice ‘MoJ’, following a report by METI’s ‘Corporate 
Value Study Group’. They proposed a rebalancing between facilitating hostile 
takeovers (to directly or more diffusely promote better corporate governance in actual 
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or potential target firms), and allowing certain defensive measures by directors and/or 
shareholders (to limit abusive ‘greenmailing’). The Guidelines and some 
contemporaneous case law seemed to prefer the more flexible test favouring 
incumbent managers developed in Delaware (Milhaupt, 2005a), compared to 
Anglo-Australian law’s much stricter protections for target shareholders and 
concomitant advantages for bidders (Nottage, 2008b). Dooley’s main innovation, 
however, is his proposal for Japan to adopt and adapt a specialised tribunal outside the 
regular court system, modelled on the Takeovers Panels found in the English law 
tradition. This follows from problems facing Japan in relying on regular court 
processes, more independent directors, or informed shareholder participation. 
However, contrasting features of such Panels in England and Australia (Armson, 
2005), a speedier and more informal process may need to be counterbalanced in Japan 
by more formal substantive rules less favourable to target managers. That may also be 
necessary to assuage concerns particularly on the part of US investors, who are used 
to litigating takeover disputes through the formal court system — albeit before the 
expert judges and tailored processes in Delaware courts.  
On the other hand, Japan’s courts now seem to be diverging from the 
substantive law applied by their counterparts in Delaware. Chapter 8 by Kamiya and 
Ito,* lawyers in Tokyo familiar with the US approach as well as experienced in many 
of Japan’s recent hostile takeover disputes, highlight and question a significant shift. 
In the recent Bulldog Sauce litigation, the first to go all the way to the Supreme Court 
(27 September 2007, 1983 Hanrei Jiho, p. 56), more weight was given to the role 
expected of target shareholders regarding defensive measures. Kamiya and Ito are 
skeptical about the ability of shareholders in Japan to make informed decisions on 
such measures, despite the dramatic rise of (especially institutional) foreign investors. 
It remains to be seen how far this line will be pursued by other Japanese courts.4 
Already, the complex case law development lends weight to Dooley’s call for a more 
streamlined and market-sensitive dispute resolution body that functions outside 
regular court processes. 
It may also be significant that the 2007 judgments came in the wake of a 
second Report of the Corporate Value Study Group (2006). This appears to give much 
greater weight to disclosure, to minimise information asymmetry so shareholders can 
give informed consent to defensive measures proposed by the Board. It also explores 
existing and potential improvements in means for shareholders, especially 
institutional investors, to become engaged in this process. The Report compares 
approaches in the US, the UK and the rest of Europe, and generally refers to finding a 
balance between the interests of bidders and target shareholders vis-à-vis target 
management. Indeed, the Introduction (p. 1) refers to its original Report (Corporate 
Value Study Group, 2005) and the related Guidelines (METI & MoJ, 2005) as ‘rules 
prepared by those who defend’ [sic]. It then contrasts takeovers rules and reviews 
developed by the ‘acquirer’s camp’ [sic]. The Report mentions reviews via the 
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Financial Services Agency (‘FSA’) that resulted in the 2006 reforms to securities law 
(outlined in this chapter’s Appendix), as well as a comprehensive set of ‘Proposals 
Regarding Fair M&A Rules’ issued in July 2006 by the Corporate Governance 
Committee of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (‘LDP’). It goes on to note that the 
Study Group membership was expanded, involving in particular more institutional 
investors, and that the Group ‘held repeated discussions on rules’ from the dual 
perspectives of the ‘defensive side’ and the ‘acquiring side’ (p. 2). 
A closer comparison of the two Study Group Reports (Corporate Value Study 
Group, 2005; 2006) confirms, for example, that six members were added. Three 
represented securities firms (Daiwa, Nikko Citigroup) or the Pension Fund 
Association, but two others represented the Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking 
Corporation (itself created in 2005 after a messy takeover battle) and a famous 
international investment bank (Lazard Freres).5 This may reflect an existing or 
emerging political battle involving very high financial stakes. A parallel would be the 
conflict over the 1960s in the UK, pitting blue-chip companies and merchant bank 
advisors against maverick hostile bidders and institutional investors. The latter won 
out and entrenched the UK City Code system from 1968. This not only enforced 
substantive rules highly unfavourable to target management, but also enforced them 
through a Takeovers Panel that relied on informal hearings and highly effective 
socio-economic sanctions (Armour & Skeel, 2007). A rather similar battle took longer 
to play out in Australia (Nottage, 2008b). Although the substantive rules also 
favoured bidders, vis-à-vis target management, a Takeovers Panel really only took 
over from the courts in 2000. It is also more formal in its operations than its UK 
prototype, and was recently subject to a further constitutional challenge for usurping 
‘judicial power’.6 
This may be making too much of the METI Study Group’s importance; but it 
suggests the importance of politics as well as economics, particularly in the field of 
takeovers and M&A. Pokarier’s chapter 9* takes this notion much further, locating the 
field in the broader context of the latest page in the story of Japanese regulation of 
Foreign Direct Investment (‘FDI’). The Government maintains a commitment to 
expanding inbound FDI towards the levels found in other major world economies, and 
Japan is now formally very open to FDI. Yet, FDI has grown much slower than 
portfolio investment from abroad, and Pokarier points out that there remains 
widespread ambivalence within Government and broader policy-making circles. 
Recent developments potentially adversely affecting foreign investors include 
considerable scope for deploying defensive measures against hostile takeovers, and 
some imminent expansion of screening and restrictions especially for certain sensitive 
sectors such as airports.  
Pokarier tests this policy mix against three models of political markets where 
state actors supply policy compromises to frequently contending constituency 
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demands, involving interests and ideas – including economic nationalist ideas. Some 
evidence can be found for and against each model. First, the ‘privatisation of 
economic nationalism’ involves the Government pursuing FDI liberalization abroad, 
including via burgeoning bilateral Free Trade Agreements (‘FTAs’), at the cost of 
formally liberalising Japan’s own regime for investment from abroad. But the 
Government devolves the task of minimising foreign control to Japanese firms 
themselves, via poison pills and so on. Secondly, and less duplicitously, the 
‘discretionary public interest’ model further devolves to firms the broader decision 
about whether to promote or resist greater foreign ownership, just as it leaves to them 
the (often overlapping decision) whether or not adopt a more Anglo-American 
committee-based corporate form. Thirdly, a ‘discretionary private interest’ model 
involves more complex contention between recognizable domestic constituencies for 
against FDI liberalization, mediated through the public policy process. Discretionary 
responses tend to be popular, but on this account (as in the other two) discretions are 
being devolved from the public to private sectors, revealing parallels to Japan’s 
liberalisation in the 1960s. It is too early to conclude whether this will result in 
informal barriers or, underpinned by competition in product markets and other 
pressures on entrenched interests, facilitate the ‘adaptive efficiency’ identified by 
North (2005) as essential to economic growth. Meanwhile, this broader context for 
takeover activity and corporate restructuring underscores Japan’s messy ‘gradual 
transformation’ since the late 1990s. 
As Kozuka concludes in chapter 10,* teasing out further interconnections 
among all authors’ combined picture of corporate governance in Japan, it is clearly 
therefore over-hasty to conclude that there has been an ‘Americanisation of Japanese 
law’. This can be seen through his innovative analysis: a comparison of key features 
of Japan’s largest companies in 2008 compared to 1988, and how these interrelate to 
various changes to laws and practices. Empirical analysis shows that many remain in 
the ‘Top 40’. However, many companies are now organised through pure holding 
companies, after a post-War prohibition was abolished in 1997 in line with Japan’s 
‘Big Bang’ financial sector reforms. Further, many large companies have gone 
through divestitures and restructuring, reflecting and prompting successive corporate 
law reforms in that field since the late 1990s (summarised in this chapter’s Appendix). 
Greater flexibility in corporate finance, another feature of the reforms, is evident in 
the remarkable displacement of banks and insurance from among the top three 
shareholders in today’s blue-chip companies. Nominees, probably institutional 
investors (including ever-growing foreign investors), have taken their place. Among 
Japan’s largest companies, greater diversity is also reflected in various shifts in 
employee numbers. On the other hand, corporate law reforms have had less effect in 
other areas, such as the Committee-based corporate form and caps on directors’ 
liability exposure. The impact appears more diffuse, as in the practice of downsizing 
boards of directors while introducing more executive officers. An emerging 
‘shareholder fundamentalism’ in takeovers law may be tempered by shareholders still 
taking into account broader stakeholder interests, even when approving defensive 
measures submitted by the board.  
More generally, this field and the areas such as directors’ duties (Fujita, 2005) 
remain heavily based on case law developments, which are inevitably messier and 
more long-term in their impact. Such developments may come as a surprise for those 
who emphasise the continental European roots of Japan’s civil and commercial law 
                                            
* Souichirou Kozuka, ‘Conclusions: Japan’s Largest Corporations, Then and Now’. 
system. However, the role of Japan’s formal court system in influencing policy and 
practices is also apparent in neighbouring fields. For example, growing activism since 
the late 1990s has constrained high-interest unsecured consumer lending, in turn 
impacting on Japan’s core banking sector (Kozuka & Nottage, 2007; 2008). 
Nonetheless, Japan’s Supreme Court is certainly not the US Supreme Court. 
In sum, applying different perspectives and methodologies to analyse a set of 
inter-connected topics, all our authors agree that Japanese corporate governance has 
been undergoing a gradual transformation especially over the last decade, but this 
certainly does not amount to a reverse ‘great transformation’ now dismantling the 
welfare state. Such broad-based support for Japan’s gradual transformation, moreover, 
accords with compelling accounts recently from experts in Japanese history or 
Japanese studies (Kingston, 2004; Blomstrom & La Croix eds, 2006), and corporate 
governance (Vogel, 2006; Aoki et al. eds, 2007), as well as political scientists and 
others comparing other post-industrial democracies (Streeck & Thelen eds, 2005).  
At first glance, those conclusions may not seem so exciting for readers 
familiar with the ever-expanding English-language literature on Japanese law (Baum 
& Nottage, 1998). That has tended to prefer ‘grand theory’ in various incarnations. 
Contributors to this book do not subscribe to the ‘culturalist’ view, still found in 
recent academic literature (for example, de Cruz, 2007, pp. 213-7) and especially in 
the popular press, asserting that the Japanese don’t like law due to traditional 
Confucian values. Nor are they completely convinced by the ‘institutional barriers’ 
perception that the Japanese can’t like law, due to problems accessing the courts and 
so on, or the ‘elite management’ theory holding that the Japanese are made not to like 
law (Upham, 1987) since such barriers are maintained to constrain unpredictable 
socio-economic change. Nor do they adopt Ramseyer’s more recent account derived 
from neoclassical economics, that the Japanese do like law – rationally settling 
disputes out of court and otherwise behaving in accordance with the relatively clear 
shadow cast by the law.  
Instead, analyses of the range of a corporate governance topics in this book 
draw on some insights from each theoretical paradigm while criticising other aspects, 
and the analyses apply a range of techniques guided by the broader methodological 
strictures outlined in Nottage’s chapter 2. In these ways, they largely accord with 
recent ‘hybrid theorists’ in Japanese law studies, who find generally that the Japanese 
sometimes like law, but sometimes don’t (Abe & Nottage, 2006). This book therefore 
joins what Anderson (2006) describes as ‘the new generation’ of scholarship on 
Japanese law and the economy.  
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• For corporate law reforms: Nottage (2006d), updating Fujita (2004).  
• For securities law reforms: JSRI (2004, pp. 327-51), Kanda (2005), Oda (2007). 
N.B. Shaded corporate law reforms come from Bills submitted by individual politicians, not the Government (traditionally, the MoJ). 
 
Table 1: Summary of Japan’s Corporate and Securities Law Reforms Since the 1990s 
 
Year Main Corporate Law Developments Main Securities and Financial Markets Law Developments 
1990 Liberalisation of some aspects of legislation for 
closely-held companies, but increased minimum 
capital bases 
• New Tender Offer (TOB) rules 
• Requirement to disclose shareholdings of 5 per cent or 
more 
1991  Prohibition on securities firms offering compensation to clients for 
trading losses 
1992  Institutional Reform Law enacted: Securities and Exchange 
Surveillance Commission launched (but linked to MoF) 
1993 z Caps on court filing fees for derivative actions 
z Introduction of a board of auditors in a large 
company 
z Relaxing the requirements for shareholders to 





1994 Deregulation of stock repurchase (lifting the 
prohibition for purposes of an employee’s stock plan 
or cancellation of the stock by shareholders’ 
meeting) 
 
1996  Liberalisation of corporate bond issuance 
1997 z Introduction of the stock option system 
z Deregulation of stock repurchases (lifting the 
prohibition for purposes of a stock option plan) 
z Deregulation of stock repurchases (simplifying 
the procedure by which public corporations can 
repurchase shares from the market, or by way of 
a tender offer or ‘TOB’) 
 
(Major securities firms and a bank go virtually bankrupt) 
 Corporate restructuring (merger procedures)  
 Increasing penalties against companies’ payments to 
corporate racketeers (sokaiya) 
 
1998 Deregulation of stock purchases (expanding available 
funds through a simplified procedure for a public 
corporation)  
Anti-Monopoly Law amendments (enacted 1997) abolishing 
prohibition of pure holding companies extended to financial 
institutions  
  Law for Securitisation of Specified Assets by Specific Purpose 
Companies (‘SPC Law’) enacted 
  Financial System Reform Law enacted: Financial Supervisory 
Agency launched (independent of MoF) 
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  Other laws enacted for financial markets reconstruction: 
• Easier entry into securities business: licensing becomes 
registration system, abolition of prohibition on securities 
firms engaging in non-securities activities 
• Securities firms allowed to offer asset management 
services (for example, ‘wrap accounts’) 
• Banks fully allowed to sell mutual funds; company-type 
funds and private equity funds allowed 
• New regulations for proprietary trading systems 
1999 Corporate restructuring (introduction of 
Share-to-Share Exchange and Share-Transfer 
procedures) 
z Full abolition of fixed commissions for securities brokers 
(partially liberalized from 1994) 
z Full liberalization of mutual entry among banking, securities 
and insurance industries through subsidiary or holding 
companies; reduced ‘firewall’ regulations 
2000 Corporate restructuring (introduction of the 
‘Demerger’ procedure) 
Consolidated (from 1999) and market-value accounting of 
financial assets, based on International Accounting Standards 
  Liberalisaton of the SPC Law (renamed the Asset Securitisation 
Law) and the Securities Investment Trusts and Securities 
Investment Companies Law (renamed the Investment Trusts and 
Investment Companies Law, allow Japanese versions of real estate 
investment trusts or ‘REITs’) 
  Securities and Exchange Law (‘SEL Law’) amendments: 




• Disclosure system liberalized to allow electronic filings (in 
effect from 2001) 
  Financial Products Sales Law enacted (in effect from 2001): 
suppliers (including banks and securities) to explain risks in 
financial products, lower requirements for clients to claim 
damages for breaches 
2001 z Deregulation of stock repurchases (completely 
abolishing the prohibition, and lifting the ban on 
‘treasury stock’) 
z Deregulation of the minimum size of shares 
z Simplifying the procedure relating to the 
reduction of statutory reserve fund 
Legislation reforming securities settlement systems:  
• Dematerialisation of commercial paper 
• Centralised Securites Depositories permitted to incorporate 
 z Authorising the electronic documentation of 
corporate information 
z Corporate finance (authorising the company to 
issue call options for its shares) 
z Simplifying the procedure for stock options 
z Corporate finance (deregulation of the issuance 
of various kinds of shares) 
 
 z Authorising the limitation of directors’ liability 
z Improving the procedure for derivative actions 
 
2002 z Creation of optional ‘Company with  
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Committees’ modelled on the Anglo-American 
corporate governance system (in effect from 
2003, first round of elections from 2004) 
z Creation of ‘Important Asset Committee’ 
z Relaxing the requirements for super-majority 
voting at the shareholders’ meeting 
z Corporate governance/corporate finance 
(introduction of class voting for the election of 
management) 
z Introduction of the registration system for lost 
securities 
z Simplifying the reduction procedure for legal 
capital and the mandatory statutory reserve fund 
z Deregulation of foreign companies 
2003 Deregulation of stock repurchases (simplified 
procedure for public corporations to repurchase 
shares on the market, or by way of TOB) 
 
2004 • Electronic public notice system z Dematerialisation of corporate securities 
2005 Consolidation of corporate legislation into new 
Companies Act (in effect from 2006), using modern 
Japanese language  
• Abrogation of yugen kaisha (similar to 




kabushiki kaisha (‘KK’ or joint stock 
companies, like AG); introduction of godo 
kaisha (limited liability companies, quite like 
the LLC in the US) and yugen sekinin jigyo 
kumiai (limited liability partnerships, quite 
like the LLP); but 
z KK divided into large and small companies 
either category of which can be established as 
closely or publically (with large and publically 
held companies requiring a more complex 
governance structure – including the option still 
of a board with committees; whereas closely 
held companies need not always treat all 
shareholders equally, statutory auditors can be 
limited to reviewing only financial statements 
and not business operations of directors, and all 
such officers can have terms extended for up to 
10 years) 
z For KK, optional accounting consultant (as an 
officer to assist directors in preparing financial 
statements), only one director possible (instead 
of at least three), minimum capital requirement 
abolished, freedom to distribute profits 
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whenever (not up to twice per annum) 
z Triangular mergers to allow the absorbing 
company in a merger to provide cash or other 
assets (for example, parent company stocks) to 
shareholders rather than issuing shares from the 
newly merged company (but full effect delayed 
for foreign companies until 2007) 
2006  z Tougher enforcement of the SEL, especially penalties (in 
effect from July 2006) 
z Takeover law amendments, such as: bids for more than 30% 
share must proceed by TOB, bidder can modify terms if target 
splits shares, target must express view on bid (but if questions 
bidder, latter must respond), mandatory bid if more than 70% 
(in effect from December 2006) 
  Replacement of SEL by the Financial Instruments Exchange Law 
(in effect from September 2007): 
z Scope broadened, for example, to cover more derivatives and 
collective investment schemes, to encompass businesses 
hitherto not regulated by the SEL 
z Better disclosure: quarterly reporting for listed companies, 
and internal compliance reporting (‘J-SOX’) (in effect from 
2008) 
 
